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IV 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the First 
Circuit Court, Cache County Division, upon a jury verdict of 
guilty of the Logan City ordinance school zone speeding 
offense. This court has jurisdiction over this appeal under 
Section 78-2a-3 (2) (c) U.C.A. 1953 as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Is Michael Thatcher not guilty of the offense 
because Logan City is bound by the law in Case No. 880451-CA 
which holds that the forms and practices in the apprehension 
and prosecution in this case are in direct conflict with 
Utah Statutory requirements and also constitute criminal 
prosecutorial practices denying due process? 
2. Is Michael Thatcher not guilty of speeding in a 
school zone because the so-called school zone is a speed 
trap totally ultra vires of the Logan City ordinance and 
State Statutes because it is more than a city block distant 
from any school or school grounds and because no school or 
other pedestrian hazards existed? 
3. Aside from the law of the Case (Issue 1 paragraph 
1, supra), is Michael Thatcher not guilty of speeding in a 
school zone because Logan City and the Circuit Court denied 
due process in employing forms and practices in his 
apprehension and prosecution which were not only in direct 
conflict with Utah statutory requirements for those 
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proceedings but also constituted criminal ultra vires 
prosecutorial practices denying due process? 
4. Does Sec. 77-7-18 - 21 deny due process because it 
prescribes citation contents designed to unfairly extort 
bail forfeitures and fines and because of facial threats of 
indiscriminate warrant issuance because of vagueness and 
because it authorizes judicial process terms to describe the 
citation? 
RELEVANT STATUTES AND ORDINANCES 
(All Utah Code Annotated 1953 references are underlined, 
i.e. "41-6-46" without other designation. 
Utah State Statutes - Speeding 
Utah Enabling Statute 
41-6-46. Speed regulations—Safe and appropriate speeds 
at certain locations—Prima facie speed limits—Emergency 
power of the governor. 
(1) A person may not operate a vehicle at a speed 
greater than is reasonable and prudent under the 
conditions and having regard to the actual and potential 
hazards then existing, including, but not limited to 
when: 
(a - d omitted) 
(e) special hazards exist with respect to 
pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of 
weather or highway conditions. 
(2) Where no special hazard exists, and subject to 
Subsection (3) and Sections 41-6-47 and 41-6-48, the 
following speeds are lawful. Any speed in excess of 
these limits is prima facie evidence that the speed is 
not reasonable or prudent and that it is unlawful: 
(a) twenty miles per hour when passing a school 
building or it grounds during school recess or 
while children are going to or leaving school 
during opening or closing hours, except that local 
authorities may reguire a complete stop before 
passing a school building or grounds at any of 
these periods. 
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(b and c and 3 omitted) (Bold face emphasis added) 
41-6-16, Provisions of act uniform throughout state— 
Local regulations. 
The provisions of this act shall be applicable and 
uniform throughout this state and in all political 
subdivisions and municipalities therein and no local 
authority shall enact or enforce any rule or regulation 
in conflict with the provisions of this act unless 
expressly authorized herein. Local authorities may, 
however, adopt regulations consistent with this act, and 
additional traffic regulations which are not in conflict 
therewith. 
10-3-701. Legislative power exercised by ordinance. 
Except as otherwise specifically provided, the governing 
body of each municipality shall exercise its legislative 
powers through ordinances. (Bold Face emphasis added) 
Logan City Speeding Ordinance 
42-7-1. Speed Regulations--Maximum Speeds--School 
Buildings—Intersections, Crossing, and Curves. 
(a) No person shall drive a vehicle at a speed greater 
than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and 
having regard to the actual and potential hazards then 
existing. In every event speed shall be so controlled as 
may be necessary to avoid colliding with any person, 
vehicle, or other conveyance on or entering the highway 
in compliance with legal requirements and the duty of all 
persons to use due care. 
(1) Twenty miles per hours when passing a school 
building or grounds thereof during school 
recess or while children are going to or 
leaving school during opening and closing 
hours. 
(2 and 3 omitted) 
(4) 40 m.p.h. on the following streets: 
400 North - Between Main Street and 1200 East 
(Others omitted under 4) 
(5 and 6 omitted) (Bold face emphasis added) 
76-8-512. Impersonation of officer. A person is 
guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he impersonates a 
public servant or a peace officer with intent to 
deceive another or with intent to induce another to 
submit to his pretended official authority or to rely 
upon his pretended official act. 
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76-8-513. False judicial or official notice. A 
person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor who, with a 
purpose to procure the compliance of another with a 
reguest made by the person, knowingly sends, mails, 
or delivers to the person a notice or other writing 
which has no judicial or other sanction but which in 
its format or appearance simulates a summons, 
complaint, court order, or process, or an insignia, 
seal, or printed form of a federal, state, or local 
government or an instrumentality thereof, or is 
otherwise calculated to induce a belief that it does 
have a judicial or other official sanction. 
Criminal Procedural Rules 
77-35-1. Rule 1 - General provisions. (a) This 
chapter shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure." 
(b) These rules shall govern the procedure in all 
criminal cases in the courts of this state except 
juvenile court cases. These rules are intended and 
shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, 
fairness in administration, and the elimination of 
unnecessary expense and delay. (Subsection (c) 
omitted) 
77-35-3. Rule 3 — Service and filing of papers. 
(a) All written motions, notices and pleadings shall 
be filed with the court and served on all other 
parties. (Subsection (b) and (c) omitted) 
77-35-4. Rule 4 — Prosecution of public offenses. 
(a) Unless otherwise provided, all offenses shall be 
prosecuted by indictment or information sworn to by a 
person having reason to believe the offense has been 
committed. 
(b) An indictment or information shall charge the 
offense for which the defendant is being prosecuted 
by using the name given to the offense by common law 
or by statute or by stating in concise terms the 
definition of the offense sufficient to give the 
defendant notice of the charge 
77-35-5. Rule 5 — Information and indictment, (a) 
Unless otherwise provided, all criminal prosecutions 
whether for felony, misdemeanor or infraction shall 
be commenced by the filing of an information or the 
return of an indictment. Prosecution by information 
shall be commenced before a magistrate having 
jurisdiction of the offense alleged to have been 
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committed unless otherwise provided by law. 
(Subsection (b) omitted) 
77-35-6. Rule 6 — Warrant of arrest or summons, (a) 
Upon the return of an indictment the magistrate shall 
cause to issue either a warrant for the arrest or a 
summons for the appearance of the accused. 
Upon the filing of an information, "if" it appears 
from the information, or from any affidavit filed 
with the information, that there is probable cause to 
believe that an offense has been committed and that 
the accused has committed it, the magistrate shall 
cause to issue either a warrant for the arrest or a 
summons for the appearance of the accused. 
(b) If it appears to the magistrate that the 
accused will appear on a summons and there is no 
substantial danger of a breach of the peace, or 
injury to persons or property, or danger to the 
community, a summons may issue in lieu of a warrant 
of arrest to require the appearance of the 
accused.... 
(c) (1) The warrant shall be executed by a peace 
officer. The summons may be served by a peace 
officer or any person authorized to serve a summons 
in a civil action. 
77-35-7. Rule 7 — Proceedings before magistrate, (a) 
(1) When a summons is issued in lieu of a warrant of 
arrest, the defendant shall appear before the court 
as directed in the summons. (Subsections (a)(2) -
(f) omitted) 
Citation Enabling Statutes 
77-7-18. Citation on misdemeanor or infraction 
charge. A peace officer, in lieu of taking a person 
into custody, or any public official of any county or 
municipality charged with the enforcement of the law, 
may issue and deliver a citation reguiring any person 
subject to arrest or prosecution on a misdemeanor or 
infraction charge to appear at the court of the 
magistrate before whom the person should be taken 
pursuant to law if the person had been arrested. 
77-7-19. Appearance required by citation—Arrest for 
failure to appear--Collection of bail amounts by 
Office of Recovery Services--Motor vehicle 
violations—Disposition of fines and costs. 
(1) Persons receiving misdemeanor citations shall 
appear before the magistrate designated in the 
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citation on or before the time and date specified in 
the citation. 
(2) No citation shall reguire a person to appear 
sooner than five days or later than 14 days following 
its issuance. 
(3) Any person who receives a citation and who 
fails to appear on or before the time and date and at 
the court specified shall be subject to arrest. The 
magistrate may issue a warrant of arrest and may 
order the Office of Recovery Services, within the 
Department of Social Services, to enforce collection 
of any bail amounts ordered by the court 
(4) Except where otherwise provided by law, 
citations or informations, issued for violations of 
Title 41, Utah Code Annotated 1953, shall state that 
the person receiving the citation or information 
shall appear before the magistrate nearest and most 
accessible to the place of violation who has 
jurisdiction over the offense charged. If the 
citation or information is issued for a 
violation within the geographical boundaries of any 
municipality or county precinct in which a justice 
court exists and in which a justice of the peace is 
currently serving, such court shall be deemed the 
nearest most accessible magistrate before whom such 
person shall appear; provided, however, that 
consistent with Section 78-4-5, informations or 
citations issued (6) It shall be the duty of 
clerks and other administrative personnel serving the 
circuit, juvenile, and justice courts to ensure that 
all citations for violation of Title 41, Utah Code 
Annotated 195 3, are filed properly in accordance with 
the foregoing subsection and to refuse to receive 
citations that should be filed in another court 
77-7-20, Service of citation on defendant—Filing in 
court—Contents of citations. (1) If a citation is 
issued pursuant to section 77-7-18, the peace officer 
or public official shall issue one copy to the person 
cited and shall within five days file a duplicate 
copy with the court specified in the citation. 
(2) Each copy of the citation issued under 
authority of this chapter shall contain: 
(a) The name of the court before which the person 
is to appear; 
(b) The name of the person cited; 
(c) A brief description of the offense charged; 
(d) The date, time and place at which the offense 
is alleged to have occurred; 
(e) The date on which the citation was issued; 
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(f) The name of the peace officer or public 
official who issued the citation, and the name of the 
arresting person if an arrest was made by a private 
party and the citation was issued in lieu of taking 
the arrested person before a magistrate; 
(g) The time and date on or before and after which 
the person is to appear; 
(h) The address of the court in which the person is 
to appear; 
(i) A certification above the signature of the 
officer issuing the citation in substantially the 
following language: "I certify that a copy of this 
citation or information (Summons and Complaint) was 
duly served upon the defendant according to law on 
the above date and I know or believe and so allege 
that the above-named defendant did commit the offense 
herein set forth contrary to law. I further certify 
that the court to which the defendant has been 
directed to appear is the proper court pursuant to 
section 77-7-21."; and 
(j) A notice containing substantially the following 
language; 
READ CAREFULLY 
This citation is not an information and will not be 
used as an information without your consent. If an 
information is filed you will be provided a copy by 
the court. You MUST appear in court on or before the 
time set in this citation. IF YOU FAIL TO APPEAR AN 
INFORMATION WILL BE FILED AND THE COURT MAY ISSUE A 
WARRANT FOR YOUR ARREST. 
77-7-21. Proceeding on citation—Voluntary forfeiture 
of bail—Information when required. (1) Whenever a 
citation is issued pursuant to the provisions of 
section 77-7-18, the copy of the citation filed with 
the magistrate may be used in lieu of an information 
to which the person cited may plead guilty or no 
contest and be sentenced or on which bail may be 
forfeited. With the magistrate's approval a person 
may voluntarily forfeit bail without appearance being 
required in any case of a class B misdemeanor or 
less. Such voluntary forfeiture of bail shall be 
entered as a conviction and treated the same as if 
the accused pleaded guilty. 
(2) If the person cited willfully fails to appear 
before a magistrate pursuant to a citation issued 
under section 77-7-18, or pleads not guilty to the 
offense charged, or does not deposit bail on or 
before the date set for his appearance, an 
information shall be filed and proceedings held in 
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accordance with the Rules of Criminal Procedure and 
all other applicable provisions of this code, which 
information shall be deemed an original pleading; 
provided, however, that the person cited may by 
written agreement waive the filing of the information 
and thereafter the prosecution may proceed on the 
citation notwithstanding any provisions to the 
contrary. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This de facto criminal action for the offense of 
speeding in a pre-textual and wholly ultra vires speed trap 
"school zone" was commenced in and on 400 North Street U.S. 
Highway 89 in Logan, Utah on December 16, 1988 by a city 
police officer while impersonating an officer of the Circuit 
Court by delivering to Thatcher a false Circuit Court 
judicial notice with numerous ultra vires fear engendering 
judicial titles and threats under a Circuit Court case 
number, captions and headings. A materially varied copy of 
the false judicial notice was filed by the policeman with 
the Circuit Court under the pretext that it was a 
"citation." 
The Circuit Court, acting on the strength of the 
pretextual "citation" false judicial notice, issued a 
Delinguent Notice and mailed the same to Michael Thatcher 
after he inadvertently failed to appear within the time 
fixed. The court in the notice threatened Thatcher with the 
issuance of a warrant on January 30, 1989 unless he paid the 
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fixed bail of $80.00 before that date. He paid the bail of 
$80.00, entered the plea of not guilty, and demanded a jury 
trial. Following his plea of not guilty to the false 
judicial notice on the 7th day of February, 1989, an 
information was filed. A jury trial was held on March 2, 
1989. Plaintiff moved to dismiss on the grounds that it was 
the law of the Karen Thatcher case and otherwise the law 
that the false judicial notice "tickets" denied due process 
and was a complete defense. 
The judge received the Karen Thatcher Brief and 
decision in evidence and denied the motion to dismiss and 
excluded relevant evidence regarding the false judicial 
notice. At the close of the city's evidence a motion to 
dismiss and for a directed verdict was added on the grounds 
that 33 miles per hour was a legal speed at that time and 
place. The judge denied the motion. The case was submitted 
to the jury. Within a very few minutes after deliberations 
began the jury returned a verdict of guilty. Time for 
sentencing was waived, a fine was imposed and sentence 
suspended on condition of fine payment. A notice of appeal 
herein was filed on the 27th day of March 1989. 
Statement of Facts 
On December 16, 1988 Michael Thatcher was a 21 year old 
single student at Utah State University living at home in 
the Young Ward community west of Logan. He was driving his 
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car to Utah State University going east on Logan's Fourth 
North street, four lane U.S. Highway 89 and the main 
highway from downtown Logan to USU, to Logan Canyon and to 
interstate points north and east. (Tr. pg. 88 - 89, Add. 
pg. 1). The posted speed limit and the speed limit 
expressly fixed by Logan City ordinance for said highway was 
40 miles per hour. (Tr. pg. 55, Add. pg. 9). As he was 
proceeding east at 33 miles per hour he was stopped by a 
Logan City police officer and was served with a false 
judicial notice. (Tr. pg. 53 and Add. Pgs. 2, 3 & 4). The 
"ticket" had a Circuit Court heading and case number and was 
variously designated as a "Summons," "Information," 
"Affidavit" charging him with exceeding a 20 m.p.h. speed 
limit in a school zone (Add. pgs. 2, 3 & 4). The Logan 
City police department had established the zones by signs 
and blinking yellow lights as a 20 mile per hour school zone 
(Tr. Pg. 48). The zone was ultra vires of two city 
ordinances and the state statute because it was more than a 
block from the Adams Elementary School and grounds (Add. pg. 
1). There were no pedestrians visible from the highway 
within the so called "school zone" at the time (Tr. pg. 58). 
The nearest school or school grounds was located a full city 
block north of the Fourth North U.S. 89 ultra vires school 
zone (Add. Pg. 1). The State statute and Logan City 
ordinance authorizes 20 miles per hour school zones only in 
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"passing a school building or grounds thereof" (Add. Pg. 9 
and 41-6-46). Another part of the same Logan City ordinance 
expressly provides a 40 miles per hour speed limit on Fourth 
North U.S. Highway 89 from Main Street Logan east to 1200 
East which includes the ultra vires speed trap (Add. Pg. 9). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This "school zone" speed trap was ultra vires of State 
law and the City ordinance and there were no pedestrian 
hazards. The use by the police and the Court of a false 
judicial notice in lieu of a "citation" ignores the law of 
an earlier case and denies due process. The Utah "citation" 
enabling act is unconstitutional on multiple grounds. 
The police department has established an 20 m.p.h. 
ultra vires school zone speed trap in a 40 m.p.h. zone over 
a block away from any school or grounds (Add. Pg. 1 Map). 
The State statute and a City ordinance expressly limit 
school zones to roads passing by "a school or its grounds." 
The same city ordinance expressly fixed the speed limit at 
40 miles per hour on this major highway. In addition there 
were no school or other pedestrian hazards at the time. 
The absurdity of the ultra vires speed trap is 
compounded by the use of extra-legal ticket forms by the 
police and court. Rather than employing a legal "citation," 
the police officer serves false judicial notice under 
circuit court numbered heading falsely entitled a "Summons," 
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"Information," and "Affidavit." (Add. Pg. 2, 3 & 4). Logan 
City and the Circuit Court have continued this illicit form 
practice in open hostility to the law and in contempt of a 
previous Court of Appeals case judgment and decision on this 
matter in which the City defaulted in brief filing and oral 
argument. 
Utah's "citation" enabling statute violates due process 
by authorizing use in citations of false judicial 
designations such as "information," "Summons and Complaint," 
and threats of indiscriminate issuance. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE EXISTENCE OF THE GESTAPO STYLE SPEED 
TRAP, LONG ESTABLISHED BY THE CITY POLICE ON 
A MAIN HIGHWAY IN OPEN HOSTILITY TO BOTH ITS 
OWN ORDINANCES AND LIMITING STATE STATUTES IS 
A PRACTICE IN OUTRAGEOUS VIOLATION OF DUE 
PROCESS. 
If it were not for the fact that these kinds of 
outrageous ultra vires official practices are the accepted 
and expected norm in Cache County local governments, this 
argument would appear to be so obvious as to be an affront 
to this Honorable Court. This case again raises the 
rhetorical guestion as to what kind of cumulative proof it 
will take for the appellate courts of Utah to recognize and 
deal forthrightly and effectively with the reality that in 
Cache County "they" have developed highly popular and 
officially mandated forms of de facto local governance which 
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are openly hostile to the rule of constitutional law and the 
state appellate jurisprudence, including hostility to the 
law of specific cases. 
The relevant facts are clearly established by the 
official Logan City Map attached as Addendum page 1 infra. 
The subject "school zone" is U.S. 89 on Fourth North between 
Third East and Fifth East. The school and grounds pretext 
for the "school zone" is Adams Elementary School and its 
Adams Park grounds occupying the full city block from Fifth 
North to Sixth North and from Fourth East to Fifth East. 
The only streets gualifying for the 20 m.p.h. school zone in 
the Adams school area are those surrounding that block and 
no others. U.S. 89 Fourth North is a full block further 
south than the authorized school zone between Fifth and 
Sixth North Streets (Add. pg. 1). 
The Logan City school zone ordinance Thatcher was cited 
and charged with violating was 42-7-1 (a)(1) which expressly 
limits the zone to "when passing a school building or 
grounds thereof" (Add. pg. 8 & 9). A later subsection of 
that same ordinance, 42-7-1 (a)(4), in designating 40 m.p.h. 
speed zones first designates this very stretch of U.S. 89 on 
Fourth North from Main Street to Twelfth East as a 40 m.p.h. 
zone. 
The ordinance limitation on school zones to streets 
adjacent to "schools and grounds" is expressly imposed upon 
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municipal authorities by the state legislature in 41-6-46 
(2)(a) and 41-6-16. These local speed traps remote from 
hazards on highways, imposed to raise local revenues would 
be perhaps the classical evil targeted by the state 
legislature by 41-6-16. The State legislature obviously 
mandated this protection to the public from the well-known 
propensity of local legislative bodies, police and courts to 
establishing speed traps for revenue raising purposes on 
main highways under the pretext of "school zones" regardless 
of the proximity of the "trap" to the primary school zone 
hazards. 
The City police have, by setting up this illegal trap, 
violated the clear mandate of the sovereign state of Utah 
and its own municipal legislature for the purpose of 
extracting property in the form of illicit fine, bail money, 
etc. as an entrenched unconstitutional practice. 
Even if arguendo, this had been a properly designated 
20 m.p.h. school zone, the 33 m.p.h. would have been lawful 
because there were no school or other pedestrian traffic 
hazards within the view of the two policemen. One policeman 
was sitting in her parked pick-up looking for pedestrians to 
escort them across the highways with a hand-written stop 
sign. She testified that there were none (Tr. pg. 77 and 
80) . 
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The State statute 41-6-46 (1) and (2) and City 
Ordinance 41-6-46 make it very clear that even the 20 m.p.h. 
limit is only prima facie. It may be overcome by evidence 
as in this case where the two policemen and Thatcher all 
concurred that there were in fact at that time no observable 
school or other pedestrians in sight. 
This local sovereign police violation of the State and 
City legislative limitations on the police authority is one 
of the clearest violations of due process of law. 
The sum of the due process violations is incredible in 
this case: 
"In general, when the sovereign has established 
rules to govern its own conduct, it will be held 
to the self-imposed limitation on its own 
authority, departure from which denies due 
process of law." 
This citation is from 16C C.J.S. Con. Law Sec. 969 pgs. 
265 & 266 citing Layton v. Swapp, D. C. Utah 484 F. Supp. 
958, above which is noted: 
"Implicit in concept of due process are ideas 
that government must follow its own rules and 
that it must do so within reasonable time." 
The compulsory nondiscretionary nature of the 
sovereign's duty to follow its own rules is highlighted by a 
continuation of the same C.J.S. citation at page 266. 
"and where a state has established procedure 
which comports with due process, state and local 
officials are bound to follow those procedures." 
(Citing Wold v. Lillie v. Kenosha County 
Sheriff, D.C. Wis., 504 F. Supp. 1 vacated on 
other grounds C.A.) 
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This locally popular notion that the police can 
establish school zones wherever they think there is a hazard 
and that rules are to be interpreted for the convenience and 
efficiency of the sovereign or its favored patrons is 
dispelled with finality by the case of Deseret Savings Bank 
vs. Francis, 62 Utah 85, 217 P. 114 (1923) and guoting from 
Supervisors vs. U.S., 4 Wall 435, 18 L.Ed. 419 as follows: 
"The conclusion to be deduced from the 
authorities is that, where power is given to 
public officers, in the language of the act 
before us, or in equivalent language -- whenever 
the public interest or individual rights call 
for its exercise -- the language***though 
permissive in form, is in fact peremptory. What 
they are empowered to do for a third person the 
law requires shall be done. The power is given, 
not for their benefit, but for his. It is 
placed with the depositary to meet the demands 
of right, and to prevent a failure of justice. 
It is given as a remedy to those entitled to 
invoke its aid, and who would otherwise be 
remediless. 
"In all such cases it is held that the 
intent***which is the test, was not to devolve a 
mere discretion, but to impose 'a positive and 
absolute duty.'" 
II. IT IS A DUE PROCESS DEFENSE THAT THESE CITY 
POLICE "TICKETS" ARE ULTRA VIRES OF THE 
"CITATION" STATUTE AND CLASS B MISDEMEANORS. 
THEIR SERVICE IS FALSE IMPERSONATION, THE FORM 
IS A FALSE JUDICIAL NOTICE. THE DEFAULTING CITY 
AND CIRCUIT COURT HAVE "THUMBED THEIR NOSES" AT 
THIS COURT'S DECISION IN CASE NO. 880451-CA ON 
THIS VERY ISSUE. 
The "ticket" forms employed by the City (Add. pgs. 2, 3 & 
4) clearly and outrageously exceed the permitted wording for 
"citations" under 77-7-10. The "citations" used in the same 
Circuit Court by the Highway Patrol (Add. pg. 6) and Cache 
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Sheriff's Office (Add. pg. 5), by contrast appear to be a 
good faith attempt to conform to 77-7-10. It is obvious on 
the other hand that in the signing and delivering of the 
"SUMMONS," (etc.) ticket the policeman is impersonating a 
summons-issuing officer of the First Circuit Court, 
committing a Class B misdemeanor of impersonation of an 
officer under 76-8-512 and committing another Class B 
misdemeanor of false judicial notice under 76-8-513. 
The ruling of the Circuit Court, excluding due process 
denial evidence at the jury trial denied Defendant's 
fundamental due process right to present all his defenses to 
the jury. Thatcher clearly has reguired standing: 
"...The accused may challenge the validity of... 
practice, or policy involved in the course of 
criminal prosecution:" (16 C.J.S. Con. Law Sec. 
73 pg. 201 & 202. Citing Berger vs. State of 
New York, N. Y., 87 S.Ct. 1873, 388 U.S. 41, 18 
L.Ed. 2d 1040.) 
Here the false judicial notice and false impersonation 
were the basis for the prosecution and extraction of 
property in the form of an $80.00 fine. 
"...The accused must show that his rights are 
adversely affected by it... (practice being 
challenged), whether or not it is the basis for 
the prosecution and such a showing is sufficient 
to support standing. (U.S. Groppi v. Wisconsin, 
91 S.Ct. 490) (16 C C.J.S. Con. Law Sec. 964 pg. 
233) 
The ultra vires practices here all violated the 
aforesaid private rights protective state statutes and 
inherently constitute a violation of due process. 
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"Due process may be effected by compliance as 
well as by non-compliance with a statute... or 
that the law (has) not been observed..." (16C 
C.J.S. Con. Law Sec. 964 pg. 233) 
The ultra vires practices employed here were calculated 
to thwart rather than fulfill the legitimate purposes of the 
law. At a minimum degree of culpability, the police, 
prosecutorial and court practices were in reckless disregard 
of the statutory procedural rights of citizens in general, 
and Thatcher. 
"The due process clauses require that a power 
conferred by law be exercised judiciously with 
an honest intent to fulfill the purpose of the 
law and it is a part of the judicial function to 
see that the requirement is met..." (16C C.J.S. 
Con. Law Sec. 967 pg. 254) 
The very most rigid standards of due process are 
applicable to criminal proceedings in general. 
"In criminal matters, due process requirements 
must be rigidly adhered to. Whether defendant's 
constitutional right to due process of law has 
been infringed in a criminal prosecution will be 
determined on the particular facts of each case, 
but any substantial doubt as to a possible 
deprivation of due process of law must be 
resolved in favor of defendant." (16C C.J.S. 
Con. Law Sec. 992 pg. 350 & 351) 
The ultra vires practices and standard ultra vires 
forms employed in this scheme are so far in violation of the 
legal protections and requirements that it appears there was 
a calculated long-standing plan with the very purpose of 
short cutting every legal and statutory protection and 
process. The City's objective was to extort fines by unfair 
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and illegal scare tactics. The whole plan appears to have 
been so outrageous as to be unbelievable, thus making it 
difficult to retain credibility and present the outrageous 
facts as they are. The triggering mechanism for the scheme 
are police officers who have been lead to believe that they 
have the power on the street of Logan to there commence a 
criminal action by their issuing and serving a false 
judicial notice "SUMMONS," "INFORMATION," under a Circuit 
Court number and with a Circuit Court heading (Add. pg. 2, 3 
& 4) . 
The simplest, most basic concepts of separation of 
powers dictate what is statutorily established in 77-35-1-7. 
A police officer belongs to the executive branch and has no 
power to issue Summons, though he may serve the same. The 
criminal action must be first commenced by the filing of an 
information with the magistrate before any criminal action 
is commenced or summons issued. The unbelievability of what 
was happening under the practice is identified by the fact 
that the Highway Patrol and Cache County Sheriff's Office, 
operating in the same community and through the same court 
and under the same State enabling legislation, avoided any 
claims to Summons issuance powers or any suggestion that 
they are "Court" officers or that there is a court number 
(See Add. pg. 5 & 6). These open and notorious claims of 
police to judicial powers constitute a classic case of 
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impersonation of a judicial officer calculated to induce 
others to submit to pretended official authority in 
violation of 76-8-512. 
The most cursory examination of the tainted Logan City 
ticket, especially when compared with the Highway Patrol and 
Cache County Sheriff's form, exposes the most blatant 
possible violation of 77-8-513 prohibiting delivery of a 
false judicial notice. The Highway Patrol form and Cache 
County sheriff's "citation" forms never once characterizes 
the citation as a Summons. Logan City's tainted ticket, on 
the other hand, among other judicial titles, characterizes 
itself as a Summons in the caption, twice in red bold type 
on the front of the ticket and in two places on the back. 
Court headings and captions are carefully avoided on the 
Highway Patrol and Cache sheriff's citation forms. The 
Logan City form, however, has a detailed and complete 
circuit court title in the format prescribed for formal 
pleadings of the circuit court and in the caption has a 
number (No. C-1875) where case numbers are reguired in 
formal court pleadings. It is obviously calculated to give 
the appearance that the violator is a defendant in a 
criminal case properly and legally filed in that court. The 
large number in the caption under the court heading is 
obviously calculated to further instill the fear that the 
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case has already been court docketed and that some fearful, 
but unspecified court action has already been taken. 
While the third point hereafter deals with the claim to 
unconstitutionality of the citation enabling act because it 
permits the use of the word "information," it is clear that 
the Logan City form exceeds even that apparent authorization 
in incredible proportions. The top heading of the "COURT 
COPY" bearing Thatcher's original signature designates the 
ticket as an "INFORMATION-AFFIDAVIT" under the Circuit Court 
heading (Add. pg 4). 
While it is clear that the Logan City ticket is a false 
judicial notice under 76-8-513 and exceeds the permitted 
verbiage of a citation under 77-7-20 its employment also 
constitutes the common law tort of an abuse or malicious 
abuse of process. There can be no doubt that the prohibited 
circuit court heading on the ticket and its repeated use of 
"Summons," Information and references that it may be the 
basis for issuance of a warrant were calculated to extort 
payment of fines and forfeiture of bail that could not be 
extracted by the use of a legal "citation." 
"It has been held that an "abuse" or malicious 
abuse" of process is its employment to obtain a 
result which the process was not intended by law 
to effect. For purposes of this tort and word 
process may encompass a range of court 
procedures incident to the litigation. The tort 
is not limited to the issuance of process, but 
extends to its oppressive use after issuance." 
(72 C.J.S. Sec. 106 PROCESS pg. 694) 
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The most charitable view that one can possibly take of 
the state of the collective official minds that led to the 
unconscionable property (and liberty) extraction scheme is 
that "they" subjectively interpreted their statutory powers 
to provide the maximum possible expedience to their 
objectives of extracting money from the public. Only the 
most "official" self-serving and convoluted interpretation 
of statutes could lead to a conclusion of legislative 
authority for this conduct. Such interpretations are the 
norm in Cache County local government even when citizens' 
property and liberty rights are at stake. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah quoting from the 
U.S. Supreme Court has mandated an opposite principal of 
interpretation to protect individual rights in Deseret 
Savings Bank vs. Francis, 62 Utah 85, 217 P. 114 (1923) 
quoting from Supervisors vs. U.S., 4 Wall 435, 18 L.Ed. 419 
as follows: 
"The conclusion to be deduced from the 
authorities is that, where power is given to 
public officers, in the language of the act 
before us, or in equivalent language -- whenever 
the public interest or individual rights call 
for its exercise -- the language***though 
permissive in form, is in fact peremptory. What 
they are empowered to do for a third person the 
law requires shall be done. The power is given, 
not for their benefit, but for his. It is 
placed with the depositary to meet the demands 
of right, and to prevent a failure of justice. 
It is given as a remedy to those entitled to 
invoke its aid, and who would otherwise be 
remediless. 
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"In all such cases it is held that the 
intent***which is the test, was not to devolve a 
mere discretion, but to impose 'a positive and 
absolute duty.'" 
B. This False Judicial Notice Matter is Res Judicata 
as to Logan City and the Circuit Court. 
One unquestionable effect of this Court's unreported 
decision in the case of Logan City v. Karen Thatcher 
(Michael's cousin) No. 880451-CA was to declare the "ticket" 
form served on Karen an ultra vires "citation" at least as 
to Logan City who totally defaulted on that appeal. The 
Appellant's brief and the decision are in the record of this 
case beginning at page 22 and is referred to herein as page 
numbers in "Karen's Brief." The printed ultra vires 
"ticket" form served on Karen on September 4, 1987 is found 
in Karen's Brief Addendum pgs. Al to A5. The good faith 
"citation" forms used by the Highway Patrol and Sheriff's 
office are in Karen's Brief pgs. A6 and A7. 
The ultra vires ticket served on Michael Thatcher about 
fifteen months later on December 16, 1988 is Addendum pgs. 
Al, A2 and A3 infra. A careful comparison shows a reprint 
and some changes that fall woefully short of correcting the 
false judicial notice character of the former version 
conceded by the City's default in the Karen Thatcher appeal. 
It is clear that the "new" ticket form retained its 
fear engendering appearance as a filed and numbered court 
headed and captioned "summons," "information," and 
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"affidavit." Multiple "SUMMONS" statements remained on the 
face including a large print caption and red print 
references with two on the reverse side in the body. Some 
former Summons references were changed to "citation." It is 
clear however that the City was intent on retaining and not 
relinguishing whatever extortive effect there was in 
continuing the false judicial scare of court heading, court 
case number, summons-information-affidavit references. It 
is clear that the City had no intent to return to the use of 
a "citation" in conformity with State law as conceded in 
their default and as evidenced by the concurrent forms used 
by the Highway Patrol and Cache Sheriff's office. This kind 
of conduct has every appearance of constituting contempt of 
this Court. 
These same false judicial notice and false 
impersonation issues on substantially similar forms were 
matters litigated in the Karen Thatcher case to which Logan 
City was a party subject to this Utah Court of Appeals 
decision within the meaning of 46 Am. Jur. 2d. Judgments 
Sec. 229 as follows: 
Indeed, the first and most obvious consequence 
of a judgment is that it establishes an 
indisputable obligation, and a final judgment 
definitely fixes the rights and liabilities of 
the parties in an action as to the matters 
submitted to it for decision. 
The note cites Adams v. Davies, 107 Utah 579, 156 P.2d. 
207 and 158 ALR 852. 
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Logan City was a party whose obligation to discontinue 
the use of those substantially similar false judicial notice 
tickets was fixed by the City's default. The City 
judicially conceded the illegality of the form and practice 
in that earlier case. If this chain of events will not 
convince this Court that Logan City's officials and the 
Circuit Court have a popular de facto system for governance 
which they believe to be superior to the rule of 
constitutional law, then exposed unfavored citizens would be 
well advised to move to another city (and state). 
III. THE CITATION ENABLING ACT IS SO PREJUDICIALLY 
MISLEADING AND VAGUE IN DESCRIBING RIGHTS AND 
LIABILITIES THAT ALL OR SUBSTANTIAL PORTIONS ARE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. THIS MATTER WAS ALSO DECIDED 
AGAINST LOGAN CITY IN THE KAREN THATCHER CASE. 
A. A careful analysis of the misdemeanor "citation" 
enabling act found in 77-7-18 to 23 and compared with 76-512 
& 513 on false impersonation and false judicial notice 
crimes, demonstrates the fine line the legislature was 
trying to walk. Their primary objective was to enable (non-
judicial) peace officers maximum public "scare" factor in 
inducing uncontested fine payments and bail forfeitures. 
They faced constitutional invalidity should the "citation" 
content go over the line in its appearance as either a 
"false judicial notice" or create an inordinate and false 
fear that a warrant may issue indiscriminately even though 
unspecified statutory protective pre-conditions to warrant 
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issuance must first be met under the law. Under general law 
and 76-8-512 & 513 a peace officer could issue a citation or 
serve a summons previously issued by a court. However, he 
would be committing two class B misdemeanors if he were to 
claim (judicial) authority to "issue" a summons, complaint 
or information on the street. 
The first citation enabling section, 77-7-18 carefully 
avoids any judicial process terminology and stays 
exclusively with "citation." However, in 77-7-19 (4) the 
reference is to a "citation or information," the latter 
being a hard judicial process term. Section 77-7-20 (i) 
confusingly then requires wording that "This citation is not 
an "information." To multiply the confusion, the preceding 
sub paragraph (i) classifies the notice as a citation, but 
then prescribes a whole series of alternative judicial 
process terms of reference to the notice: 
"I certify that a copy of this citation, or 
information (summons or complaint) was duly 
served..." 
Then the following: 
"READ CAREFULLY" 
This citation is not an information and will not 
be used as an information 
Section 77-7-21 compounds the inconsistency by clearly 
identifying an "information" as a separate and later process 
that may be filed with the Court if specified options are 
exercised by the citation recipient. 
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The Logan City traffic ticket form is so clearly a 
false judicial notice that its examination does little to 
aid in demonstrating the finite unconstitutional elements in 
the citation enabling act (Add. A1-A5). 
The Highway Patrol citation form (Add. A7), compared 
with the sheriff's form (Add. A6) reveal two divergent 
attempts to walk the fine line between a "citation" and a 
false judicial notice under 76-8-513. 
The Highway Patrol form excludes anything that may have 
the appearance of court captions or jurats that could be 
construed as indicia of judicial process. The enabling 
statutes do not expressly address these indicia of judicial 
process, but the false judicial notice statute inherently 
prohibits them. The sheriff's form raises a red or gray 
flag in this respect by highlighting a notary jurat which 
seems to have no purpose other than to create an 
unauthorized judicial process scare. 
The Sheriff's office titles its ticket form however, as 
a "CITATION INFORMATION." This clear incursion into 
judicial process terminology appears to be expressly 
authorized by 77-7-20. This directly conflicts with the 
letter and spirit of the false judicial notice statute 77-8-
513. 
In apparent recognition of this problem with the 
enabling act and presumably with the aid of the Attorney 
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General, the Highway Patrol uses the title of "CITATION" but 
not the "information" title as does the Sheriff's form. 
The 77-7-20 legislatively authorized citation statement 
that, absent a timely appearance, an Information "will be 
filed" and that the court "may" issue an arrest warrant is a 
grossly misleading scare. A form of this false judicial 
threat is on the reverse side of all three police agency 
versions of the tickets. 
An honest, straight forward due process reference as to 
what may transpire in the judicial processing of a failure 
to appear on the ticket would need to contain the following 
statements in order not to be materially and prejudicially 
misleading to its recipients: 
"Informations" may be filed on the offense 
charged and on a separate failure to appear 
offense if you wilfully fail to appear as 
promised. Thereafter the court will issue a 
summons or, may upon finding probable risks of 
dangers, in lieu of a summons, issue a warrant 
for your arrest." 
Anything less is a material misleading scare violating 
due process. The "will" file an information statement gives 
the false impression that there is no prosecutorial 
discretion to refuse to prosecute under any circumstances. 
The commonly used option to the information filing process 
of mailing notices and demands is totally absent. The 
"warrant may issue" statement deceitfully omits the 
"summons" process which is the compulsory formal process 
following information filing absent a finding based on 
evidence of likelihood of the dangers specified in 77-35-6 
Ibi. 
The insidious evil which this misleading legislation 
spawned is evident in what must have been hundreds of 
thousands of dollars of fines paid and bail forfeited in 
this illicit speed trap in which no one has openly raised 
the issue that it is not a 20 m.p.h. school zone. Logan 
City's last 20 years of operation and support of its huge 
police force substantially depended on this and other 
similar illicit traps and fear engendering false notice 
"tickets." These were all popularly supported practices 
under their so called better de facto governmental system. 
B. The issue under this Point was raised and briefed 
identically in the Karen Thatcher brief Point III pages 38 
through 42. Point II B supra is incorporated by reference 
regarding the res judicata effect of the Karen Thatcher 
judgment of reversal. The judgment of reversal in that case 
inherently include a conclusion that, at least as to 
defaulting Logan City (and Karen Thatcher) the Utah citation 
enabling act is unconstitutional. It would also appear that 
Logan City as a defaulting party to the earlier (related) 
appeal should be bound thereby regarding continuing use of 
any false judicial notice "tickets" on whomever served. 
There appears to be a direct confrontation in these cases 
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between the state level appellate judicial authority of this 
Court and the apparent contempt of a local police (and 
court) system that will not be deterred. This de facto 
local governmental system is popularly and openly hostile to 
the rule of constitutional law. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should not only render a reversal of the 
guilty verdict but should also stop the local rebellion 
against the rule of constitutional law clearly evidenced in 
this case. There should be a reported decision establishing 
the law on all issues raised. In view of the apparent 
contempt shown for the decision of this Court by 
Logan City in the Karen Thatcher case, the Court should 
consider exercising its extraordinary writ power to require 
conformity to the law of this case by both Logan City and 
the First Circuit Court. 
Respectfully submitted 
Attorney for Defendant Appellant 
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which the law provides a penalty up to 6 months in jail or $1,000.00 fine or both. 
COURT ACTION: Fine S Suspended $ 
davs in County Jail clr.y-,
 w^K>eno'ed 
Delay in execution to the day of 198 
Trial Date day of 198 at • a.m • p.m 
Bail set $ Bail Forfeited 
Receipt No. Date Amount $ 
CIRCUIT COURT: 140 NORTH 1ST WEST Clerk Office Hours: 
Logan. Utah 84321 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. 
Mondays through Friday 
except iegal holidays. 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF CACHE 
IN THE MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT OF LOGAN CITY, CACHE COUNTY. UTAH 8432' 
CITATION OR INFORMATION 
AND NOTICE TO APPEAR 
A f H E CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OfS +HE 
IN THE n*J.4lClPAL DEPARTMENT OF LOGAN CITY, CACHE COUN/r- UTAH 84321 
STATE Of UTAH 
COUNTY Of CACHE 
CITY Of LOGAN 
No.C- 1 8 7 5 
INFORMATION - AFFIDAVIT 
The undersigned being duly sworn upon his ooth deposes ond soys /~\^i 
' ia\t (PI»o*»j>rin») f i / M,ddl« ^ 
Nome 
*T&& (So St 
City. 
Age. 
Dnv Lie No _Stole 
C *<~*& S? 
t-/ / 8 „ ^ , . <>y-L/f7' 
&A»<*, 
z, J->~ 
Sex (^MoTe' O Femole 
Upon o public highway namely at (location). 
„ Color 
? T^ / 5 l ^//^ 
^Vo<^^> 
did unlawfully operate the above described vehicle m the city county and state aforesaid and did 
then and there commit the following oHeme 
•
 m 
5 c 
o • 
? l 
T3 
So 
SPEEDING " 5 ^ 
Improper LEFT TURN 
Improper RIGHT TURN 
Q Disobeyed TRAFFIC 
CONTROL SIGNAL 
Disobeyed STOP SIGN 
Improper PASSING 
FAILURE TO YIELD 
m p h in ^ &~ m p h zone / / ^ ^ " <%"/ / ^ " 
a No signal 
Q No signol 
Q Flashing red 
Q Steady fed 
Q Wrong place 
Q At Intersection 
0 At ?9d 
X walk 
Q ?%d Q Veh 
Other violatiom (describe) 
in violation of the (State Statute) (City Ordi 
Q Cut corner Q From 
wrong lone j 
(—] Into wrong r-j From wrong 
lane fane ] 
D Improper bocking 
0 Too fast for existing conditions I 
Q Walk speed Q fosif | 
Q Cut in Q Wrong lone 
Q Across 
physical bar Q On right J 
FOLLOWING TOO CLOSELY Q I 
nance) in such cose mode and provided j 
- ° 
o — 
• ° 
w O 
£ > 
§ S 
^ 2 
SLIPPERY 
PAVEMENT 
DARKNESS 
a Ram 
D Snow 
a ke 
D Night 
D Fog 
D Snow 
CAUSED PERSON 
TO DODGE 
LJ Pedestrian 
Q Onver 
D JUST MISSED 
ACCIDENT 
OTHER TRAFFIC 
PRESENT 
AREA D Business 
HIGHWAY TYPE Q 
D Cross 
nj^€Trvcoming 
Ped£}if>an 
ection 
Q Industrial 
2 lone Q 3 lane 
(_} estrian 
Q^5ome Dir  
PO D P I O Fatal 
{ Q Ped 0 Veh 
i n Hit fixed obi«ct 
ILJ Right Angle 
Heod on 
Sideswipe 
Ran off Rood 
Intersection 
f e n d 
Residential 
Q < lane div«ded 
I certify that a copy of this Citation or Information was duly served upon the defendant 
according to law on the above date and I know or believe and so allege that the above named 
defendant did commit the offense herein set forth contrary to law I further certify that the 
court to wnich the defendant has been directed to appea/ is the proper court pursuant to 
Section 77 7 21 (SK 77 7 19) 
Sworn and subscribed to before me 
this day of 198. 
. Circuit Judge 
*&?>&• ^- u r ^ v 
^Signature and identification of A 
'officer or other complainant) J 
2JL. day of COURT ABEARANCE 
ADDRESS OF COURT & CLERK OFFICE 140 NORTH 1ST WEST LOGAN UTAH 
WITHOUT AOMITTING GUILT I PROMISE TO APPEAR AS OIRECTED HEREIN 
d 
I 
CO 
en 
COURT COPY Slgna,ure 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF CACHE 7rz -ists 
THE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY 
GIVEN NOTICE TO APPEAR BEFORE 
JUDGE 
LOCATED AT / V - / "U> /£ A > ^ < ^ / ~ 
< ^ ~ < ^ DAY OF ON OR BEFORE THE 
t ^ A - ^ - > ^ ^ - 7 
.. 19. JP 
AT THE HOUR OF. ?.'c^ A>J/RM. 
IN THE ^<jyt^ & '<*?*^< ' ^  COURT. 
FOR COURT USE ONLY 
DATE OF CONVICTION/FORFEITURE 
FINE SUSPENDED 
i 
JAIL SUSPENDED 
PLEA/FINDING 
G Guilty 
D No Contest 
D Not Guilty 
D Forfeited Bail 
SEVERITY 
1.1 Minimum 
Q] Intermediate 
D Maximum 
Signature of Judgo or Clork Required 
CACHE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE 
UNIFORM CITATION OR INFORMATION 
AND NOTICE TO APPEAR 
CASE NO. 
3 &H. nO 0 3 - 1 4 -
CITATION NO. A456817 
Name (Last) 
/£*4^/ 
(First) (Middle) 
Address 
Place ol Birth 
(City) (State) 
DOB 
C/rcA/ 
Driver License No. 
Picture ID 
ffiYes D No 
rtyNunn 
&At4 
(Zip) 
Social Securfty Numbor HI. 
State 
hide Color Vehicle Year 
Wt. 
Phone 
Hair 
Vehicle License No. 
Vohicle Make TVpo 
Eyos 
3^> 
Race 
Stato 
Model 
THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT IS CHARGED WITH VIOLATING: 
UT | CO I CY 
X 
X 
"¥ f i * # 
-A pj± &*> A? (1^, he *-•/*>• 
Location 
Date ^ , 
19 j y 
DLD 
USE 
Military Time 
WITHOUT ADMITTINQ>6tjXT. I P f OMISJE TO 
SIGNATURE 
Speeding 
Mil* Post No. 
Code f 
V/t vt, 
Y/-/-/r> 
Interstate 
G Yei W No 
. In • . 
_^J: . zone 
m 
Expires 
"fr? 
Accidont 
Misd. 
Cit. Tral. 
K 
Ui 
Direction irectu 
E W 
MRTo^eT 
ERECTED HEREIN: 
X6qk##52£^flfe 
I CERTIFY THATttDPt OF THIS CITATION OR INFORMATION VWS DULY SERVED UPON THE 
DEFENDANT ACCORDING TO LAW ON THE ABOVE DATE AND I KNOW OR BELIEVE AND SO 
ALLEGE THAT THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT DID COMMIT THE OFFENSE HEREIN SET 
FORTH CONTRARY TO LAW. I FURTHER CERTIFY THAT THE COURr TO WHICH THE DEFENDANT 
HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO APPEAR IS THE PROPER COURT PURSUANT TO SECTION 77-7-19. 
OFFICER. O- cJ><^ ID /If. < J 
COMPLAINANT. ID # . 
DATE. 19. 
MISD. CIT.-BCI 
TRAFFIC-COURT 
Date Sent to DLD Docket No. 
RIGHT INDEX 
UNIFORM CITATION AND 
NOTICE TO APPEAR 
l /TAH 
P x STATE OF UTAH 
Q'^COUNTY OF i C i ' -
D CITY OF 
THE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY 
GIVEN NOTICE TO APPEAR IN: 
COURT OF 
LOCATED AT 
*'.,-/"* " 
/ " / : 
'f . , G^,^ 
AJ < /CO i~J • 
Not less fhan (5) five ncx more than (J 4)Tourteen days after iysuonce of 
this citation, (see fevp^-.3Hfe-oj_c|e(cncTflpti^copyuJatrJjaiLJfff/eihflc 
information). 
• J fcw TUB"— ' 
FOR COURT USE ONLY 
DATE OF CONVICTION/FORFEITURE 
FINE SUSPENDED . 
JAIL SUSPENDED . 
PLEA/FINDING SEVERITY 
D Gui l ty D M i n i ™ m 
D N o Contest r - i , , •• , 
LJ Intermediate 
O No t Gui l ty 
D Forfeited Bail O Maximum 
DLD 
© M 1 
ISSUED 
BY: UTAH HIGHWAY PATROL 
CITATION NO. 
NAME (Lost) (Fir,.) 
7\. 
• ! X - ^ o i V 
ADDRESS 
J L \y\n^P 
(Middle) 
B 262294 
ic$<? AJ- /7<r 
(Cily) 
QfJL / 
Driver License Ncv 
Vehicle Color Vehicle Yeor 
/9- ^ 
Slate 
1 
U? 
Vehicle License N a 
DOB 
5- Z 5 - . 3 - C 
Type 
<X^^ v 
V 
ZIP 
Stale
 f 
Jjt 
2H3-2-I 
Accident 
R N 
expires 
f-3L 
Dt 
N i . 
'// 
THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT IS CHARGED WITH VIOLATING: , 
Q-UTAH CODE • COUNTY CODE • CITY CODE N O : _ J _ ^ l _ _ _ k L 
Aa O N ^ ^ - ^ ' ^ THE / . DAY OF 
(day of week) 
LOCATION -3^ jdl** 
, 1 9 Q v ) MILITARY TIME 
-zrZ-l_£L 
< ^ <7/ MILE POST N O . . 
VIOLATION(S): . X - < ^ C L ^ 
ts A 
Speeding . o . mph in a . s 
MPH 
OVER / $ " INTERSTATE: D YES urio 
STOP SIGN 
F S 
WITHOUT ADMITTING GUILT I PROMISE TO APPEAR AS DIRECTED HEREIN: 
SIGNATURE. 
/ 
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THIS CITATION OR INFORMATION (SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT) WAS DULY SERVED UPON THE DE 
FENDANT ACCORDING TO LAW O N THE ABOVE DATE A N D I K N O W OR BELIEVE AND SO ALLEGE THAT TME ABOVE N A M E D DEFEN 
DANT DID COMMIT THE OFFENSE HEREIN SET FORTH CONTRARY TO LAW. I FURTHER CERTIFY THAT Tf IE COURT TO W l IlCH T, "•» ' 
DANT HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO APPEAR IS THE PROPEft COURT PURSUANT TO SECTION 77 -7 -2 1 (77-7-19) . 
r 
OFFICER 
DATE 
• eL-^-"-" +-- \sL c .BADGE * / / 
/ ' 
, A D . ]? . 
DEFENDANT COPY 
DATE SENT TO DLD DOCKET N Q 
DELINQUENT NOTICE 
._„^OWTHATVOUHAVEEA,LEOT< 
=0URT - L03AN U t L U ^ U - • - T 0 A P P 6 A B 
UT84321
 O R D E p 0 S l T BAIL FOR TH 
- 5 3 - 0 8 => —_____^ IMPORTANT
 W L L 
S ^ S R S ^ A T E SHOWN. 
YABLEJO: r F IRST 
, MICHAEL S 
^ H £300 WE* ' 
FIRST CIRCUIT COURT L-
p.O. Box 2*1
 uTe432i 
LOGAN 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
CCUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT 
LOGAN CITY, 
Plaintiff 
) 
I N F O R M A T I O N 
vs. 
THATCHER, Michael Stacey 
1800 South 2800 West 
Logan, Utah 
Defendant 
ZFlciisw 
The undersigned, RICHARD HENDRICKS under oath, states on the 
information and belief that the above named Defendant carmitted the 
crime (s) of: 
SPEEDING (SCHOOL ZONE) (CLASS C MISDEMEANOR) 
at Logan, Utah on 12/16/88 in violation of the following sections of the 
Revised Ordinances of Logan City: 
42/7/1 
That, contrary to Logan City Ordinances, Defendant's acts 
constituting the offense were: 
That the Defendant did drive at a speed greater than was reasonable and 
prudent under the conditions and having regards to the actual and 
potential hazards then existing namely 33 raph in a 20 mph zone (SCHOOL 
ZONE). 
Class C Misdemeanor 
This information is based on evidence obtained frcm the following 
witnesses: 
B. FILLMORE, LCPD 
Authorized for presentment & filing 
Subscr ibed & sworn tfo be fo re me 
t h i s -7 ^ i a y ^ o f ]£fe £_ 1 9 ^ . Logan Ci ty P rosecu to r /At to rney 
DAMAGES: YES / NO/ 
CIRCUIT COJRT JUDGE T 
^ 
/<t^ <£ A~& 
Chapter 7. 
23 
SPEED REGULATIONS 
42-7-1 Speed Regulations—Maximum Speeds — School Bui ld ings--
intersections, Crossing, and Curves 
(a)] No person shall dr ive a vehicle at a speed greater than 
TS reasonabl e_jad prudent under the condit ions and having regard to_the 
actual and potential hazards then ex is t ing In ewery event speed "shall 
be"TcTcbn t ro l led as may~be necessary to avoid co l l i d i ng with any person, 
vehicle, or other conveyance on or entering the highway in compliance wi th 
legal requirements and the duty of a l l persons to use due care 
(P^ The following speeds shal l be lawful unless otherwise posted 
Speeds in excess of the fol lowing l i m i t s or in excess of the posted l im i t s 
shall be prima facie evidence that the speeds are not reasonable and prudent 
and that they are unlawful 
1. Twenty miles per hours when passing a school bui lding or 
grounds thereof during school recess or while chi ldren 
are going to or leaving schoot^'during opening and 
closing hours 
2 Twenty-five miles per hour in any business, resident ia l 
or urban d i s t r i c t inside the^c i ty l im i t s of Logan Ci ty , 
unless otherwise posted 
3 Speeds other than those l i s t e d in subparagraphs 1 and 
and 2 above may be allowed wi th in the corporate l im i t s 
of Logan City whenever i t T-S determined upon the basis 
of an engineering and t r a f f i c invest igat ion that the speed 
permitted by law is more or less than is necessary for the 
safe operation of the vehicles thereon Any such chance 
in speeds shall be posted by properly erected signs giv ing 
notice thereof 
—4—"Speed l im i ts on state highways wi th in the c i t y l im i ts shall 
be as posted by the state 
42-7-2 Driving Too Slow No person shall drive a motor 
vehicle at such slow speed as to impede or block the normal and reasonable 
movement of t r a f f i c except when reduced speed is necessary for safe operation 
in compllance with law 
42-7-3 Speed or Acceleration^ Contests No person shall dr ive 
a motor vehicle at such a slow speed as to impede or block the normal and 
reasonable movement of t r a f f i c except when reduced speed is necessary for 
safe operation in compliance with law 
42-7-4 Obstruction for Exhib i t ion Forbidden No person shall 
for the purpose of f a c i l i t a t i n g , aiding or as an incident to any vehicle 
sPeed contest or vehicle acceleration contest in any manner obstruct or 
Place any barricade or obstruction or assist or par t ic ipate in placing any 
such barricade or obstruction upon any st reet or a l ley 
(CHAPTER 7 AMENDED 9/23/82) 
P*.se. A-? 
24 
^b-v Boulevard - Between 200 East and the Intersection of 
600 East and ^00 North * 
Main Street - Between 400 South and 700 North 
600 West - Between 900 Nortn and 2QCftouth 
Southwest Street - Between Three Point Avenue and 300 South 
Park Avenue - Between South City Limits and Southwest Street 
800 East - Between 900 North and 1000 North 
1000 West - Between South City Limits and 300 South 
300 South - Main Street to 400 East 
V3L. 35 m.p.h. on the following streets' 
\ 600 West - Between 900 North and 1500 North 
1400 North - Between Main Street and 600 West 
4. 40 m.p.h. on the following streets: 
^ 4 0 0 North - Between Main Street and 1200 East 
^SMain Street - Between South City Limits and 400 South and 
Between 700 North and 1100 Horth 
800 East - Between 1000 North and North City Limits 
1400 North - Between Pain Street and 1500 East 
1000 West - Between 200 North and 1400 North 
1400 North - Between 1000 liest and 630 West 
_5s, 50 m p.h. on the following streets* 
\ Ma i n Street - Between 1100 North and 'lo^ th City Limits 
Highway 89 - Between 1200 East and East City Limits 
&/ 55 m.p.h. on the following street 
y\ 200 North - Between 600 West and West City Limit 
42-7-2. Driving Too Slow. 
No person shall drive a motor vehicle at such slow speed as to imoede 
or block the normal and reasonaole movement of traffic except when reduced 
speed is necessary for safe operation in compliance with law. 
42-7-4. Speed or Acceleration Contests. 
No person shall engage in any motor vehicle speed contest, or in any motor 
^icle acceleration contest on any street or alley, and no person shall aid 
•^ abet any such vehicle SDeed contest or acceleration contest on any street 
r
 alley. 
42-7-4. Obstruction for Exhibition Forbidden. 
No person shall for the purpose of facilitating, aiding or as an incident 
«ny Vehicle speed contest or vemcle acceleration contest in ary manner 
'
ruct or place any barricade or obstruction or assist or participate in 
Mng any such barricade or obstruction upon any street or alley. 
(SEC. 42-7-1 AMENDE D 12/17/31, 
S E C . 42-7-4 A M E N D E D 1 2 / 3 / 8 1 ) 
fk*e. A'/P 
